Armata Romana

Armata Romana, incotro prin studii si analize

Articolul de fata se vrea o scurta recenzie a catorva analize/studii/articole aparute in ultimii ani despre cum ar trebui sa arate Armata Romana, spre ce anume ar trebui sa tinda, cum sa se reformeze, in viziunea unor analisti, organizatii sau publicatii.

Primul studiu pe care il aduc in discutie, intitulat Adaptarea structurii Armatei Romane la cerintele prezentului si viitorului apropiat, publicat in anul 2008, in Revista Institutului Diplomatic Roman, face parte dintr-o serie de articole denumita, NATO: puncte de vedere romanesti inainte si dupa Summitul de la Bucuresti.

Conform autorului, Armata Romana trebuia sa faca tranzitia catre o forta expeditionara, optimizata pentru misiuni extrateritoriale si sprijinita intern de structuri care genereaza si regenereaza forte.

In acest sens ar fi fost necesara o Forta Permanenta, o Forta Expeditionara si o Forta Teritoriala.

Un lucru aparte in aceasta analiza este reprezentat de necesitatea(conform autorului), introducerii unor arme si denumiri noi.

Astfel, Fortele Terestre ar fi constat din urmatoarele arme:

– Garda: trupe de reprezentare, cercetare si actiuni speciale.

– Grenadieri: infanterie grea, purtata integral pe vehicule blindate, avand in organica batalionului subunitati de artilerie autopropulsata(de camp, antiaerian si antitanc).

– Dorobanti: infanterie usoara transportata cu mijloace neblindate, avand in subordine artilerie tractata.

– Lancieri: trupele blindate (tancuri), si dispunand de subunitati de artilerie autopropulsata.

– Rosiori: trupe aeropurtate.

Aceste trupe ar fi trebuit sa fie dislocate in mai multe baze situate in: Suceava-Vatra Dornei, Focsani-Buzau, Babadag, Bucuresti-Ploiesti, Brasov, Curtea de Arges, Cluj-Turda-Luna si Timisoara.

Regimentul 30 Garda

Fortele Terestre ar fi trebuit sa aiba urmatoarea organizare:

– 1 Regiment de Garda.

– 2 Regimente de Grenadieri.

– 3 Regimente de Dorobanti.

– 2 Regimente de Rosiori.

– 2 Regimente de Vanatori de Munte.

– 1 Regiment de Lancieri.

– 2 Regimente de Artilerie

– 1 Regiment de Aparare Antiaeriana

– 1 Regiment de Comunicatii.

– 1 Regiment de Aviatie.

– 2 Regimente de Geniu.

– 2 Regimente Logistica.

– 1 Regiment protectie NBC.

– cate o companie de Politie Militara pentru fiecare baza.

Fregata Regina Maria

Fregata Regina Maria

Fortele Navale ar fi trebuit sa renunte la navele fluviale, pe care sa le transfere Ministerului de Interne iar in schimb sa preia navele maritime ale Garzii de Coasta, si sa dezvolte o structura de forte capabila sa sustina misiuni expeditionare, compusa dintr-o Unitate Expeditionara Navala, dotata cu:

– 3 Fregate, care sa poata asigura aparare antiaeriana, antisubmarin si sa sprijine cu foc infanteria marina.

– 1 Nava de debarcare capabila sa transporte un batalion de infanterie marina, sprijinit de blindate si artilerie, nava care ar fi trebuit sa fie capabila sa opereze elicoptere.

– 2 Nave de realimentare.

– 2 Nave Logistice.

Si dintr-o Brigada de Infanterie Marina.

Fortele Aeriene ar fi urmat sa renunte la flota de elicoptere pe care sa o transfere Fortelor Terestre, si sa se rezume la misiuni de aparare a spatiului aerian national/politie aeriana, transportul unitatilor/materialelor in/din teatrele de operatii, actiuni ofensive impotriva fortelor inamice.

Acestea ar fi trebuit sa aiba capacitatea ca in termen de maxim o luna sa poata proiecta intr-un teatru de operatii o unitate de dimensiunea unei brigazi si sa ii asigure sprijinul logistic, de asemenea aviatia de lupta trebuia sa fie capabila sa participe la misiuni externe impreuna cu aliatii Romaniei dar cu sprijinul logistic al acestora.

Pentru atingerea acestor obiective se considera necesara finalizarea achizitiei avioanelor de transport mediu curier(C-27J Spartan), achizitionarea unor noi avioane de transport cu raza lunga de actiune si cu capaciatate de transport sporita si achizitionarea celor 48 de avioane multirol(obiectiv inca de actualitate la acel moment).

In anul 2010 Armata Romana si spre ce anume ar fi trebuit sa tinda a primit putina atentie din partea lui George Friedman, care in contextul achizitiei de catre statul roman a 48 de avioane F-16 Block 25 si Block 52(achizitie care a fost abandonata in cele din urma), considera aceasta decizie ca fiind una gresita si mult prea ambitioasa, Romania trebuind sa isi compuna in opinia sa, o armata ale carei obiective principale sa fie apararea frontierelor cu Republica Moldova si Ucraina.

“Şi, în acest scop, este nevoie de forţe mobile de infanterie, elicoptere, Humvee, oameni antrenaţi. Nu veţi avea suficiente avioane de luptă pentru o confruntare cu forţele ruseşti”

Astfel concluziona analistul american care ar fi trebuit sa fie directia de urmat pentru Armata Romana.

Doi ani mai tarziu, in anul 2012, Partidul National Liberal (care in acel an avea sa dea ministrul apararii), emitea un document privind viziuea partidului in legatura cu viitorul Armatei Romaniei, care in perspectiva anului 2030 ar fi urmat sa aiba o structura schitata astfel:

1. Structuri de comandă și control:

  •  Statul  Major General:  rol,  coordonarea procesului  de generare si regenerare a fortelor;
  • Statul  Major al  Fortelor Terestre: rol  de generare si regenerare a fortelor terestre;
  • Statul Major al Fortelor Aeriene: generare si regenerare a fortelor aeriene;
  • Statul  Major al  Fortelor Navale:  generare si regenerare a fortelor navale;
  • Comandament  Operational  Intrunit:  rol  de conducere a fortelor in operatii (organizat pe  structuri tip “Joint”) ;
  • Comandamentul  Logistic  Intrunit:  rol,  coordonarea  procesului logistic de generare si regenerare a fortelor si  asigurarea logisticii operationale.

2. Capabilități Forțele Aeriene:

  • Transport Aerian Strategic : SAC/NATO : C-17 (x 200  ore zbor/anual);
  • Transport  Aerian Tactic :  4 aparate C-130,  7 aparate C-27J (scurt-mediu  curier),  elicoptere  transport  Puma/Puma modernizat (motoare Makila);
  • Aviatie  de  lupta:  avioane  multirol  de  generatia  a  cincea:  2 escadrile (x 16 aparate F-35)
  • Aparare anti-aeriana : (SHORAD , V/SHORAD , HSAM )

3. Capabilități Forțele Navale:

  • Nave de lupta multifunctionale: 4-5 LCS ;
  • Escadrila Elicoptere navale si  navalizate pentru misiuni  SAR: 16 aparate ;
  • Fregate tip C-22: 2 nave;
  • Supraveghere maritima: Sistemul SCOMAR ;
  • Batalion Infanterie Marina.

4. Capabilități Forțele Terestre.

  • 1  Divizie  Infanterie  (x  3  Brigazi  de  manevra),  la  dispozitia NATO ;
  • 1 Divizie Infanterie (x 4 Brigazi de manevra), pentru generare si regenerare a fortelor;
  • 2  Escadrile  de  Elicoptere  de  atac  (cu  posibilitatea  cresterii numarului acestora);
  • Sisteme de avioane fara pilot de nivel tactic si operativ.

Document in care erau reiterate mai multe obiective de dotare si posibil optiuni de organizare, mentionarea obiectivului de dotare cu aparatul de generatia a V a, F-35, era echivalenta cu o sustinere a achizitionarii de avioane F-16 in defavoarea dotarii cu un avion de provenienta europeana, discutie inca de actualitate la acel moment.

F-35

Structura organizatorica a Fortelor Terestre compusa din 2 divizii si 7 brigazi, este similara cu vechiul obiectiv de redimensionare al armatei de uscat, in 2005, se estima ca la nivelul anului 2015 Fortele Terestre vor avea urmatoarea structura:

În cadrul Structurii de forţe pentru 2015, Forţele Terestre vor dispune de o brigadă mecanizată, o divizie de infanterie cu o brigadă mecanizată, o brigadă de infanterie blindată, o brigadă de vânători de munte, mari unităţi şi unităţi de sprijin de luptă şi mari unităţi şi unităţi de suport de luptă, şi de un comandament de generare/regenerare, tip divizie, cu o brigadă mecanizată, o brigadă de infanterie blindată, o brigadă de vânători de munte, mari unităţi şi unităţi sprijin de luptă şi mari unităţi şi unităţi suport de luptă  

Ultima analiza prezentata a fost publicata recent pe blogul Defence and Fredom, si conform autorului, Armata Romana trebuie sa treaca printr-un proces drastic de redimensionare.

Fortele Navale ar trebui sa fie practic desfiintate, unele nave putand sa fie transferate unor agentii de politie din afara armatei.

Fortele Aeriene sa fie reduse de la statutul de categorie separata de forte la cel de componenta aeriana, pastrand un numar redus de elicoptere, o escadrila de avioane F-16 care sa fie folosita pentru misiuni de Politie Aeriana si sa conserve un numar de aerodromuri pe care in caz de necesitate sa fie dislocata avioane militare ale NATO.

F-16 Romania

Fortele Terestre sa fie transformata intr-o militie cu 3 categorii de batalioane.

  • batalioane cu misiunea de a intarzia operatiunile inamice in estul Muntilor Carpati.
  • batalioane cu misiuni de securiatate pentru apararea obiectivelor majore(de infrastructura, industriale, a oraselor).
  • batalioane care sa adopte tacticile Jagdkampf / Raumverteidigung pe zona granitei cu Republica Moldova si Ucraina, aceasta urmand sa fie singura categorie de unitati care sa necesite echipamente avansate cum ar fi armamentul antitanc.

Per total Fortele Terestre ar urma sa fie organizate intr-un numar de 4 brigazi cu un repertoriu limitat, un regiment cu misiunea de a apara capitala si cateva batalioane teritoriale.

Procurarea de echipament nou sa se limiteze la armament antitanc, echipamente de comunicatii si sisteme de vedere pe timp de noapte.

Razboiul electronic, apararea antiaeriana, sprijinul aerian, sprijinul de artilerie ar urma sa vina doar din suportul pe care alte armate aliate i l-ar putea oferi Armatei Romane, ale carei capabilitati nu ar mai acoperi aceste zone.

Desi am incercat sa fiu impartial in prezentarea acestor studii, ultima structura imaginata, cu siguranta i-ar merge la suflet oricarui consilier sovietic.

– David Victor –

 

 

12 Comments

  • Tipul de scrie in serai NATO are examenul psihologic la zi ? De ce sa te concentezi pe expeditionar, avem colonii ? Daca tot faci rost de artilerie autopropulsata mecanizat/motorizat, reactiva si clasica, ce rost mai are tractata? Denumirile sunt idioate, parerea mea. Nava pentru desant ? In rest treaca mearga dar daca asta e analist si da dracu sa il asculte cineva e nasol. Mai departe, viziunea PNL, vorbe si vrajeala politica. Ultimul articol este prostie in stare pura, cristalizata si slefuita. Pe bune, indivizii merita sa fie “decapitati” se pare ca oricum nu au intentia de a isi folosi capul.

  • Bre Victore,ai matale mereu placerea sa amesteci contabilitatea cu bataia 🙂

    1.Aia cu fortele expeditionare e moarta si ingropata.Daca tii minte matale,baiatu’ a zis de ani de zile ca scopu’ de baza e apararea patriei,restu is mofturi.
    2.Aia cu numele de acum 150 de ani era fain de facut daca se reformeaza toata armata de la 0.Altfel…
    3.Nus’ ce ai bre cu neamtu’ ala.Presupun ca-i neamt/austriac pt ca foloseste niste termeni nemtesti care nu cred ca-s cunoscuti de 15 romani si 100 de anglo-saxoni.

    Pre scurt,jagdkampf e lupta dusa in adancimea inamicului cu structuri de maxim un batalion,pe stilul loveste si fugi in faza initiala,iar cand sunt conditii favorabile (adica noi atacam) astia infiltrati actioneaza ca orice forta aflata in adancimea inamicului(cam ca niste parasutisti,numai ca nu-s parasutati ci merg pe jos,pe nevazute,pana ajung unde trebuie.Cujeta la tacticile de infiltrare finlandeze din razbelu mondial.Sau la cele japoneze din faza initiala a invaziei Asiei de SE.
    Raumverteidigung e idee austriaca de razboi rece,care spune ca se fac zone fortificate unde se lupta pana la ultimul cartus,in timp ce inamicul in rest e combatut in stil jagdkampf.

    Cat de bune si actuale is ideile astea se vede din faptul ca toate actiunile ultimilor ani urmeaza in linii mari liniile directoare.Desigur,nu inseamna ca toata lumea citeste nemteste,ci ca asa e caracterul razbelului modern.

    4.Aviatia e oricum in plus la razboi,ca-s 12,ca-s 48,iar flota maritima e 0 barat la razboi fara submarine.Flota fluviala e in schimb altceva.Ala de o vrea la MAI nu are intelegere asupra fenomenului.

  • Stai domne putin, neamto-austriacu’ zice asa:

    Same as before regarding navy and air force, but the army would be different in this model:
    It would focus on four relatively cheap brigades with a limited repertoire. They would focus on what the current army is moderately capable of already, mostly
    reduction of pockets
    combat in urban and woodland terrain
    This requires some addition of modern anti-MBT munitions, modern radios, minimum quantity of modern night vision equipment for infantry (and security pickets of other units) and very little else. Interoperability would be of little concern; these brigades or their battalion battlegroups would be sent into an area to defend or clear it with little assistance by allied forces, and until further notice.

    One regiment for the capital and a couple reserve security battalions would form the backup territorial forces.

    ..si..

    The capabilities of these brigades would still be modest (the training budget would likely not suffice for much mobile warfare proficiency), and they would depend on allied forces (mostly corps support) for electronic warfare, military intelligence, air defence, counterartillery, long range fires, precision fires, air support including rotary aviation support et cetera.

    Adica omul ne spune ca decat o armata mare si limitata, sa avem o armata mica si si mai limitata

    Cheap brigades inseamna, fara cine stie ce blindate, fara tancuri, plus ca ne spune cu subiect si predicat, ca trebuie sa avem o armata fara capabilitati de razboi electronic(fara AZUR care ar fi util), fara artilerie serioasa(fara LAROM, care iarasi este util), fara elicoptere de atac(fara SPIKE-urile de pe SOCAT-uri care sunt utile), fara aparare aa, cat de cat serioasa(fara HAWK+ATAR care pot sa aiba un nivel de eficacitate, nustiu daca si fara Gepard, GDF-003, Shorar), deci fara multe chestii utile pe care deja le avem.

    Si eu cred ca una dintre solutiile de a scoate armata din impasul in care se afla este o redimensionare, dar care sa plece de la ideea, decat mult si nu prea bun, mai bine mai putin si mai bun si sa redirectionezi fondurile necesare mentinerii unei structuri vaste, catre o structura mai mica si mai fasneata.

    Sa spunem ca are loc o reformare a armatei in efectivele tipului asta, 4 brigazi, 1 regiment si cateva batalioane teritoriale/rezerva/voluntari.

    Cred ca astea 4 brigazi/1 regiment/cateva batalioane, trebuie sa le ai boboc, sa incerci sa le pui deasupra un sistem aa foarte bine pus la punct(MEADS/HAWK/VL-MICA/SIRET), sa intaresti artileria, sa dezvolti capabilitati de lovire la 150-300 Km, cumperi radare, artilerie autopropulsata, sa cumperi 2 batalioane de Leo 2, CV-90, Boxer-romanizat, Iveco LMV, drone, intaresti capabilitatile de razboi electronic, 1-2 escadrile de elicoptere de atac, echipament individual cat mai bun etc.

    Cu marina, in situatia in care suntem si ce perspective limitate sunt, de acord cu tine, cu aviatia, este de discutat.

    Escadrila de F-16, poate sa fie o structura de lovire strategica(la nivelul baltii rusesti), pe care o poti aduce la nivelul asa fara sume astronomice, cumperi un lot de 20-30 JASSM si invadatoru’ sovietic in caz de trozneala stie ca risca sa ramana fara Slava, fara vreo fregata, poate cu niste deranj pe Belbek.

    Daca reusesti sa ai doua escadrile de F-35, este o placere si mai mare pentru invadatoru’ sovietic sa stie ca primul val al aviatiei lui o sa intalneasca cateva celule de F-35, fiecare avion cu cate 6 AIM-120D, despre care habar pe unde se afla, dar care F-35-uri ii vad Flankerele lui de la 200 Km, oricat de smardoi s-ar crede 10 racheti cand sunt in gasca, nu prea cred ca au tupeu sa intre sa cafteasca un rahitic care sta intr-o camera fara lumina cu 3 cobre regale langa el.

    Plus posibilitatile de riposta pe care ti le-ar da un asemenea avion, asupra navelor din M.Neagra, a Crimeei, chiar pana spre Rostov.

    Dintre armatele-schiatate aici, aia cu Viziunea PNL mi se parea in linii mari cea mai apropiata de realitate, minus fregatele, LCS-urile si Hercules-urile, adica o armata de 60.000-70.000 de oameni mai bine mobilata.

    • Structura aia a neamtului evident ca nu o pot nici io accepta.Da,in principiu alea 4 brigazi de manevra facute tipla,ok.Ar insemna o structura de forte undeva la 35000 de flacai.Dar pe langa astea,undeva la 50 de batalioane de infanterie usoara,asta insemnand ca au o gramada de mijloace AT,MANPAD,drone si mortiere.Plus echipamentul si instructia de infanterie aduse in secolu’ asta.

      Brigazile grele is rezerva mobila.

      Poti sa ai 20 de escadrile de Battlestar Galactica,cata vreme agresoru’ are initiativa primul lucru e sa-ti lichideze bazele,cu tot cu caricioplane.

      Aceleasi capabilitati,daramat airopoarte si dat nave la pesti le fac rachetele cu baza la sol,care-s prin natura lor mai ieftine si usor de protejat.

      • Orice viziune care nu are in vedere o structura consistenta de rezerva grabnic mobilizabila,e danpixulea.Si totul facut in limita a 2 miliarde de euro anual.Ca astia-s banii.

        LCS-uri si de astea sunt simptomul unei crancene saracii intelectuale.Daca e ceva care-mi da fiori e taman rigiditatea asta a sefimiii politico-militare.Limba de lemn la greu,dar nici nu gasesti vreunu sa gandeasca original.

  • Propun si eu o analiza a unui specialist occidental, cam ce ne-ar trebui in cazu in care… Un scenariu de conflict posibil.

    (…)
    ” Therefore even if Putin would demand a ground offensive at Bender, there is little chance for Russia to mount one, especially as Romania would be supplied generously by America with Javelin missiles and other advanced equipment.

    Still, Romania’s army equipment is outdated and needs to be replaced in its entirety : new main battle tanks to replace the obsolete TR-85M1 tanks with their weak 100mm gun; new infantry fighting vehicles to replace the MLI-84M, which combines an obsolete BMP-1 chassis with a modern remote turret; Romania already procured 31 Swiss Piranha IIIC wheeled armored personnel carriers, but a further 600 are needed to replace the outdated BTR-60/70/80 variants in service; towed 155mm howitzers and self-propelled 155mm howitzers are needed, as are surface-to-surface guided missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, man-portable air-defense missiles, a medium range air-defense missile system and drones.
    This makes Romania, along with Poland, one of only two interesting European nations for the global defense industry. However as Romania’s government spending is still under IMF control and as Romania needs modern equipment as quickly as possible and as it has a strong local defense industry, only those nations who can “donate” modern equipment to Romania right away and are willing to outsource much of the production to Romania, can hope to enter the Romanian market.

    Donate Leopard 2A6 now, get a deal

    Let me give you an example: Romania urgently needs a new main battle tank, which its arms industry could produce with foreign help. However even before production in Romanian could commence, Russia and Romania might be already in the middle of a war.
    Therefore i.e. if Germany would offer Romania 54 of its stored Leopard 2A6 tanks for free now, with the understanding that Germany’s KMW would then produce a further 250 tanks in Romania and get paid a higher price for the new tanks to compensate Germany for the 54 “donated” tanks, Romania would instantly agree to such a deal, as it would provide Romania with a modern tank battalion now, would not need IMF approval and would strengthen Romania’s defense industry.

    As Romania’s Army has to this point almost no Western equipment, all Western defense companies can compete for the many needed weapon systems: America’s M1A2 Abrams, France’s AMX Leclerc, Germany’s Leopard 2A7, Britain’s Challenger 2, even South Korea’s K2 Black Panther, Japan’s Type 10 or Israel’s Merkava IV tank – the market is wide open for the nation that finds a way to help Romania circumvent the IMF-imposed spending limits.

    As for new infantry fighting vehicles: Italy’s Dardo, Spain’s Pizzaro, Germany’s Puma, Sweden’s CV-90, South Korea’s K21, America’s M2A2-ODS Bradley, Japan’s Type 89 are all possible options.
    The possible options for wheeled armored personnel carriers are too numerous to list, but as Romania’s industry is definitely capable to produce this kind of system, the nation willing to shift most of the production to Romania will get the deal.
    For the self-propelled and towed 155mm howitzers Romania can choose between the self-propelled German PzH2000, American M109A7, Polish AHS Krab and South Korean K9 Thunder, while for the towed variant the only real option is the American M777 howitzer.
    As for surface-to-surface guided missiles there too is just one option: the American HIMARS system with MGM-140 ATACMS Block IVA.

    Last but not least the only two anti-tank guided missiles that any nation should buy are either the Israeli Spike or the American Javelin, supplemented by Swedish MBT LAW light anti-tank missiles.
    As for man-portable air-defense missiles and a medium range air-defense missile system: either the American FIM-92F Stinger or the Polish GROM 2 should be licensed for production in Romania, while clearly the American-Norwegian NASAMS II is the frontrunner for the medium range air-defense system.
    If Romania will settle on the NASAMS II, it should acquire it jointly with Poland to reduce unit costs.

    Romania’s army also needs more unmanned aerial vehicles, i.e., drones. While on deployment in Iraq, Romanian troops used the American ScanEagle, one of the best naval drones. Romania should acquire a dozen ScanEagles and split them between its Army and Navy.

    Romania’s Navy, while numerous, is outdated and lacks submarines and air defense frigates. Currently Romania’s fleet consists of 13 surface combatants and a Kilo-class submarine, which cannot dive and is moored permanently in Constanța harbour.
    Romania’s two Type 22 frigates lack air-defense missiles and a close-in weapon system to shoot down incoming missiles. However as Romania’s main goal in a war with Russia will be to deny Russia the use of the Black Sea between Crimea and Odesa, the acquisition of modern air-defense frigates isn’t as urgent as the acquisition of a long-range air-defense system, modern sea mines, submarines, long-range anti-ship missiles, and anti-submarine warfare helicopters.

    By buying American MIM-104 Patriot air-defense systems and deploying them along the coast of Romania and the Budjak, Romania can create a protective umbrella for its fleet extending 100km into the Black Sea.
    Romania’s currently most advanced air-defense system is the MIM-23 Hawk XXI with a range of 50km, which is not enough to protect Romania’s fleet while it harasses Russian supply lines.
    As the US Army stores dozens of surplus Patriot systems, Romania could quickly put this system into service.
    Having eliminated the threat of Russian aviation, Romanian ships should lay dozens of sea mines in the approaches to Odesa to force Russia’s Navy into an endless mine-sweeping operation. Acquiring submarines will force Russia to send supply ships only in heavily guarded convoys to Odesa. With submarines Romania could even attempt to mine the exits of Sevastopol bay and thus blockade Russia’s Black Sea fleet in port until the mines are cleared. Because the designing and construction of submarines takes years, Romania needs to buy used submarines from one of its NATO allies. Currently Italy offers two 25-years old, but modernized Sauro-III submarines for sale, which are still better than anything the Russian Navy has in the Black Sea.

    Poland already tr
    Poland already trains with the Naval Strike Missile
    Replacing its Soviet-engineered 4K51 Rubezh anti-ship coastal missile system with a more capable long-range anti-ship missile system like the Norwegian Naval Strike missile or the Swedish RBS-15 missile will provide Romania with a system capable of sinking enemy ships up to 200km from its shore. Such a truck-mounted, long-range missile system, protected by Patriot and Hawk XXI air-defense systems would effectively deny Russia’s Black Sea Fleet the use of the gulf between Odesa and Crimea.

    As Russia plans to add six submarines to its Black Sea Fleet, buying anti-submarine warfare helicopters would greatly improve Romania’s capability to detect, engage and sink Russian submarines lurking outside Romanian harbors. Romania already has three French-designed and Romanian built IAR 330 naval helicopters that are being modernized for the anti-submarine warfare role, however at least six additional anti-submarine warfare helicopters should be acquired.

    Romania’s Navy currently has six missile-boats and seven corvettes and frigates on its rolls, none of which possess an air-defense system, making surface sorties outside the Patriot provided air-defense umbrella risky. To augment the fleet with air-defense missile frigates Romania could either acquire used Italian Soldati-class frigates, of which Italy currently offers four for sale, or buy German Bremen-class frigates, eight of which Germany is currently taking out of service. Romania will need to build faster, more agile, stealthier, better equipped and armed missile boats and corvettes; Romania should commence development of such a class within the shortest time possible. Ideally Romania would seek the advice of Finland, which is the undisputed leader in building heavily armed and fast multi-purpose corvettes like the Hamina-class missile boats.

    Finland’s “Pori” missile boat in Helsinki’s harbor
    Finland’s “Pori” missile boat in Helsinki’s harbor
    If Romania speedily acquires the key systems mentioned above its Navy will be able to remain undefeated in a war of attrition against Russia and be able to protect Romania’s coast from Russian attacks. This ability of Romania to remain undefeated in a war of attrition against Russia would be even further enhanced if Romania would be able to acquire more modern fighters for its air force. Currently 12 F-16AM/BM Block 15 MLU ordered from Portugal’s stock are the most modern fighters in Romania’s arsenal. This is not enough, not by a long shot.

    In a war of attrition against Russia, Romania would see its 12 F-16 and 36 MiG-21 LanceR destroyed by Russia’s air force within weeks. Romania needs at least 48 additional F-16 fighters as soon as possible. However the price for this number of jets is out of reach for Romania, and therefore the only option for Romania is, just as for Bulgaria, to lobby the United States to provide 48 used American F-16C/D Block 40/42 fighters, which can be upgraded in Turkey via the US licensed Common Configuration Implementation Program to Block 50/52+ fighters. If Romania succeeds in this endeavour, then it will be able to withstand a Russian war of attrition on land, on the sea and in the air.

    Ultimately Russia cannot win a war of attrition against Romania if Romania controls the Budjak and ensures its air-defense is modernized. Only an all-out attack by Russia’s air force and Navy could then break the Romanian line of defense along the Budjak’s coast or on the Dniester, but that would see the US military enter the fight and annihilate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and devastate Russian forces in Odesa. Therefore I assume that Russia will keep its focus on combat against Ukraine while keeping its war of attrition against Romania at a low boil. This stalemate could naturally be broken if Romania and Ukraine would go on the offensive in a joint operation.

    A joint Ukrainian-Romanian attack on Transnistria and Russian forces in Odesa would overwhelm the Russian forces there quickly. However Putin made it clear that if he were to lose a battle, then he would use tactical nuclear weapons against the attacking force to “de-escalate the situation.” If it comes to this, then Russian forces on Crimea will fire Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads against Romanian and Moldovan cities to cow both into surrender. The only possible defense would be for Romania to acquire additional MIM-104F Patriot batteries in the ballistic missile defense role, as the US Navy‘s Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense system activated this year at Naval Support Facility (NSF) Deveselu is based too far inland to effectively protect Romania’s coastal cities and Moldova.

    Romania would be even smarter to avoid going on the offensive and patiently wait for Russia to bleed out economically, or wait until the Kremlin loses it patience and either attacks Romania or the Baltic States and then loses the ensuing NATO-Russia war. Afterwards Romania and Ukraine could divide Transnistria among them with the Romanian settled areas joining the united Romanian nation.
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  • Nici nu merita daca se incheie cu tampenia de impartire a Transnistriei, sa nu uitam Bugeac, Bucovina si Maramures plus modul cum e tratata comunitatea romaneasca. Ucrainienii sunt doar niste rusi mai prapaditi care pana sa o ia pe coaja de la Putin faceau pe ai dacu cu noi.

    • Si daca faceau,ce gheseft aveau?

      Pana la noi ordine,ei ii tin pe rusi in frau.Momentan nu se poate discuta de Bucovina pt ca politica,dar si bunul simt,desi din cate am bagat de seama romanii de acolo au observat ca unde flutura tricolorul e mai bine.Sa mai treaca apa pe Nistru,sa se mai aseze lucrurile.

  • Eu cred ca mai rentabil ar fi un schimb de populatie si teritoriu Transnistria contra Bugeac si Bucovina, chiar daca istoric avem dreptul si la teritoriul de peste Nistru. Noi ne alegem cu provinciile inapoi si ei scapa de enclava. Oricum ies ucrainienii in avantaj, au stapanit si cules roadele atat timp, Transnistria este mai bine dezvolatata decat restul teritoriilor din schimb si raman si cu banii de la Krivoi Rog. Am putea sa incercam sa ii ajutam pe basarabeni si apoi sa cera unificarea cu noi. Ucrainienii nu cred ca pot refuza sa stie ca au spatele asigurat si Putin nu poate oricum sa atace direct in zona.

  • crezi tu ca-i lasa rusii pe transnistreni sa fie alipiti Ucrainei… va iesi o baie de sange acolo, mai devreme sau mai tirziu. Oricum Bucovina n-o mai vezi in veci inapoi, e pierduta pentru totdeauna.

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