The 21 August attack can only have been ordered and lead by the regime
The combined attack lead on August 21 corresponds to a classical tactical pattern (artillerypreparation, then ground offensive) and the use of chemical agents was integrated in a tacticalmaneuver consistent, on a military level, with the Syrian armed forces’ doctrine. Reliable intelligence from several of our partners mentions specific preparations in the days just before August 21.Conventional air and artillery bombardments took place between 3 and 4 am on the Ghouta East. Inparallel, the locations of Zamalka, Kafr Batna and Ayn Tarma were reached by chemical attacks.
At 6am, a ground offensive was launched by the regime against these cities. Several sources mention the use of artillery rockets, different from those of the best knownammunition stock (missiles and bombs). Our technical analyses confirm that the rest of rockets observed on that occasion, as for some previous and local operations, allow the use of chemicalagents. The regime then lead important air and ground strikes on the attacked areas. It made efforts to delaythe arrival of inspectors over several days. These elements confirm a clear willingness to destroy anyevidence a posteriori.
Furthermore, the military set off fires, aiming apparently at purifying theatmosphere thanks to the air movement generated by the intense heat.Our intelligence confirms that the regime feared a wider attack from the opposition on Damascus atthat moment. Our assessment is that the regime was trying by this attack to loosen the grip and tosecure sites strategic to control of the capital. For example, the area of Moadamiyé is located closeto the Mezzeh military airfield, which houses the barracks of the Air Force intelligence.<
Anyhow it is clear, by examining the targets of the attack, than only the regime itself could havetargeted positions that were so strategic for the opposition.
Finally, we consider that the Syrian opposition does not have the capacity to lead an operation of that size with chemical agents. No group belonging to the Syrian opposition has, at this stage, thecapacity to stock and use these agents, and even more in proportions comparable to what was usedon the night of August, 21 in Damascus. These groups have neither the experience, nor the know-how to implement them, particularly through vectors as those that were used during the August 21 attack.
Extrasul de mai sus este partea de încheiere, concluzia, unei evaluări a comunității de intelligence, evaluare ce se află la baza retoricii americane ce propovăduiește intervenția armată împotriva regimului Assad. Întreg documentul poate fi citit AICI.
Același document, rod al muncii serviciilor franceze de informații, subliniază faptul că forțele guvernamentale nu au ”calcat pe bec” pentru prima oară, făcând referire la atacurile – de mult mai mică anvergură – din Aprilie, din regiunea Jobar. Ei, dar ce ne facem cu alte ”dovezi video”
pe care vestul alege să le ignore?
De asemenea evaluarea francezilor concluzionează că rebelii nu au la dispoziție mijloacele pentru fabricarea, stocarea și lansarea unui asemenea atac…
Până atunci, mult-așteptatul rezultat al investigațiilor comisiei de experți ai ONU va demonstra fără putință de tăgadă dacă s-a folosit sau nu sarin-ul. Nu va putea atribui și vina pentru lansarea atacurilor…
Deci? Cum rămâne? Cine a fost la servă, cine la primire?..